



Anti-Scientism, Conceptual Analysis 
and High-End Science Journalism1
Abstract | In Ancient Greece, when philosophy began, it included all theoretical knowledge. 
Later, however, at the time of Aristotle, specialized sciences began to emerge and the scope of 
philosophy grew smaller and smaller. Th e question is what to do when philosophy has lost its 
ability to deal with any relevant topic. Th e paper discusses three possible views of the relation 
between philosophy and science: anti-scientism, conceptual analysis and naturalism. All these 
approaches have various disadvantages. For anti-scientism it is mainly the inability to explain the 
unprecedented success of modern science. Proponents of conceptual analysis are confronted with 
Quine’s attack on analytic statements and its consequences for a priori truths. Finally, naturalistic 
philosophers might be threatened by the hegemony of science and its universal application of 
the hypothetico-deductive method. Th e worst scenario for naturalistic philosophers is not as 
bad as some fear. Philosophers can solve their traditional problems using a knowledge of well-
established special sciences, even though they might play the role of high end science journalists.
Keywords | Philosophy – Science – Anti-Scientism – Conceptual Analysis – Naturalism – 
W. V. O. Quine – Common Sense
Let me begin with a story we all know quite well. In Ancient Greece, when philosophy began, it 
included all theoretical knowledge. Later, at the time of Aristotle, however, specialized sciences 
began to emerge and the scope of philosophy grew smaller and smaller. Philosophy lost logic, 
poetics, rhetoric, history, geography, meteorology, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, zool-
ogy, botany, geology, paleontology, etc. Th e social sciences went overboard in the 19th century: 
economics, sociology, psychology and political science. Th e burning question is: what is left  
for philosophy, if anything at all? As the German philosopher Odo Marquard puts it: what to 
do when philosophy has lost its ability to deal with any relevant topic?2
Th ere are thinkers who believe that this means the end of philosophy as we know it. Some of 
them might be considered scientifi c celebrities, most of them are theoretical physicists. Th ere is 
a famous quote, for example, usually attributed to Richard Feynman: “Philosophy of science is 
about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.”3 Another Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg 
in his book Dreams of a Final Th eory distinguished between the unreasonable eff ectiveness of 
1 Th is study was supported by a grant “Th e Epistemological Status of Science and the Demarcation Problem of Pseudoscience” 
(2014–2016, no. 452100761) from the Faculty of Arts, Palacký University in Olomouc. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the Ernst Mach Workshop in Prague on May 5, 2014.
2 Odo Marquard, “Inkompetenzkompensationskompetenz? Über Kompetenz Und Inkompetenz Der Philosophie,” in Abschied 
Vom Prinzipiellen: Philosophische Studien (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981), 23–38.
3 Feynman’s authorship is disputed, it is commonly claimed that he said so in an interview for the documentary television 
series Horizon on BBC.
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mathematics and the unreasonable ineff ectiveness of philosophy.4 Th e British chemist Peter Atkins 
explained his opinion of philosophy as follows: “It seems to me we’ve got to get rid of philosophy 
because it is really such a ball and chain on progress… a philosopher is really just a nuisance.”5 
Probably the most famous contemporary theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking in his book Th e 
Grand Design, co-authored by Leonard Mlodinow, wrote this harsh remark: “Philosophy is dead. 
Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists 
have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.”6 Lawrence Krauss 
is less serious when he makes fun of professional philosophers in an interview for Th e Atlantic: 
“Philosophy is a fi eld that, unfortunately, reminds me of that old Woody Allen joke, ‘those that 
can’t do, teach, and those that can’t teach, teach gym.’”7 Finally, Freeman Dyson, the doyen of 
quantum electrodynamics, addressed contemporary philosophers with this fi erce comment: 
“Compared with the giants of the past, they are a sorry bunch of dwarfs. Th ey are thinking deep 
thoughts and giving scholarly lectures to academic audiences, but hardly anybody in the world 
outside is listening. Th ey are historically insignifi cant.”8
I believe that we should take this criticism seriously. We cannot just say that we are misun-
derstood and that the ill-informed scientists cannot see the benefi cial eff ect of philosophy on 
society. We also cannot feel hurt and sorry for ourselves. On the contrary, we have to deal with 
a serious question: what to do in philosophy aft er the end of philosophy? As far as I can see, there 
are three possible views on the relation between philosophy and science, all of them popular in 
the 20th century: anti-scientism claiming that science is partially or wholly mistaken, conceptual 
analysis that considers philosophy a special kind of enterprise unrelated to natural science and 
naturalism thinking highly of science as a model and inspiration for any serious inquiry. In the 
remainder of my paper I will try to explain all these three positions and demonstrate their pos-
sible weaknesses. I shall begin with anti-scientism.
1
Th e anti-scientifi c stance is commonly held in so-called continental philosophy. We can identify 
two versions diff ering in their intensity. Th e moderate point of view claims that there is some-
thing wrong with science; this is quite common among phenomenologists stemming from the 
tradition of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Th e radical point of view claims there is 
everything wrong with science; supporters of this position are to be found in post-structuralism 
or postmodernism and among followers of Derrida’s deconstruction.
Th e basis of moderate anti-scientism dates back to the works of German phenomenologists, 
for example in Husserl’s Th e Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
from 1936 or Heidegger’s lecture “Science and Refl ection” from 1953.9 Particular details aside, 
both thinkers acknowledge that since Galileo modern science has had a long record of success 
in describing the natural world. Unfortunately, science has failed in a much more important 
assignment. It is completely inept when dealing with Lebenswelt, which is usually translated as 
4 Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Th eory (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 169.
5 Peter Atkins, “Science as Culture” (Beyond Belief: Enlightenment 2.0, University of Oxford, 2007).
6 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, Th e Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), 13.
7 Lawrence Krauss, interview by Ross Andersen, Has Physics Made Philosophy and Religion Obsolete?, Th e  Atlantic, April 23, 
2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/print/2012/04/has-physics-made-philosophy-and-religion-obsolete/256203/.
8 Freeman Dyson, “What Can You Really Know?,” Th e New York Review of Books 59, no. 17 (2012), accessed on May 5, 2014, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/nov/08/what-can-you-really-know/.
9 Edmund Husserl, Th e Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Martin Heidegger, “Science and Refl ection,” in 
Th e Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 155–82.
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Lifeworld. Th is is the subjective realm of a person’s inner experience that is inaccessible by an 
objective methodology of scientifi c inquiry. According to Husserl and Heidegger, only philosophy 
can be of any use here, and by “philosophy” they mean their particular kind of transcendental 
phenomenology.
A more radical version of anti-scientism can be traced in writings of authors from gender 
studies, primarily those inspired by postmodern philosophy of science. Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar published an infl uential book Laboratory Life in 1979 in which they denied the possibil-
ity of acquiring any scientifi c truths and declared that “the daily activities of working scientists 
lead to the construction of scientifi c facts”.10 Scientifi c practice frequently serves as an instrument 
of political oppression, usually aimed against minorities. I will demonstrate this with two exam-
ples of this approach: in the fi rst one Sandra Harding criticizes modern physics as anti-feminist; 
in the second one Fiona Erskine does the same with evolutionary theory. Harding writes:
“A consistent analysis would lead to the conclusion that understanding nature as a woman 
indiff erent to or even welcoming rape was equally fundamental to the interpretations of these 
new conceptions of nature and inquiry. In that case, why is it not as illuminating and honest to 
refer to Newton’s laws as ‘Newton’s rape manual’ as it is to call them ‘Newton’s mechanics’?”11
Erskine argues similarly:
“Darwin’s theories were conditioned by the patriarchal culture in which they were elaborated: 
he did not invent the concept of sexual diff erence… Th e Origin provided a mechanism for con-
verting culturally entrenched ideas of female hierarchy into permanent, biologically determined, 
sexual hierarchy.”12
Th e anti-scientifi c stance has a number of problems that I cannot deal with in such a limited 
space. I will point out only a few, such as: (1) Th e inability to explain the unprecedented success 
of modern science; we owe science and technology for living in the happiest era of human history. 
(2) Th e inability to off er an alternative to scientifi c inquiry; phenomenology and postmodernism 
have not produced anything useful except colorful stories that we can either accept or not. (3) Th e 
frequent use of obscurant, incoherent or meaningless language that disqualifi es anti-scientifi c 
authors from any serious inquiry. Th e most bizarre, however, is the fact that anti-scientism 
criticizes modern science because of its alleged political agenda, but is usually connected with 
a very specifi c set of social and political aims.13
2
Th e next approach to the relationship between philosophy and science is the conceptual analysis. 
Th is stance is as old as analytic philosophy itself, but a particularly well formulated version of it 
can be found in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein. In a particularly famous 
passage 4.111–4.112 Wittgenstein explained the role of philosopher as follows:
“Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences… Philosophy aims at the logical clarifi cation 
of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists 
10 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: Th e Construction of Scientifi c Facts (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
1979), 40.
11 Sandra Harding, Th e Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 113.
12 Fiona Erskine, “‘Th e Origin of Species’ and the Science of Female Inferiority,” in Charles Darwin’s “Th e Origin of Species:” 
New Interdisciplinary Essay, ed. David Amigoni and Jeff  Wallace (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 118.
13 Th ere are many excellent publications on misdemeanors of postmodern theory: Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher 
Superstition: Th e Academic Left  and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Alan 
Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures (London: Profi le Books, 1998); Noretta Koertge, ed., A House Built on Sand: 
Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: 
Against Relativism and Constructivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). I recommend reading them if you are in doubt.
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essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in “philosophical propositions”, but rather 
in the clarifi cation of propositions.”14
All true sentences are expressed by science which provides a complete picture of everything 
that can be said about the world. What lies outside the borders of meaningful scientifi c sentences 
is nonsense that cannot be communicated by linguistic means. Th e role of philosophy is quite 
minimalistic: to determine the border itself, to fi lter sense from nonsense. To cite the great 
Wittgensteinian scholar Gordon Park Baker:
“Wittgenstein polices the bounds of sense, sharply reprimanding philosophers who com-
mit off ences by uttering nonsense. Th e activity of clarifying concepts or describing grammar is 
corrective therapy.”15
I am afraid that this therapeutical conception of philosophy is too modest and unambitious; 
most philosophers are not interested in policing the scientifi c neighborhood, they want to deal 
with traditional questions of philosophy. Unsurprisingly, there are thinkers who use conceptual 
analysis for something more. A number of contemporary philosophers describe their philosophi-
cal practice as being concerned with the elaboration of conceptual truths. Th ese are: (1) beliefs 
without empirical content, (2) derived from language by conceptual analysis, (3) usually based 
on expert philosophical intuitions, (4) oft en illustrated by elaborate thought experiments. Again, 
I cannot describe all the problems of conceptual analysis as a method of acquiring philosophical 
knowledge, but I can emphasize the most important one. Th is is the emergence of naturalized 
epistemology in 1951 when W. V. O. Quine fi rst published “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.16 Th e 
attack on analytic truths has serious consequences for other terms that are vital for conceptual 
analysis – “a priori” and “necessary”. Quine asserts that all knowledge originates in sensorial 
experience; there are no analytic, a priori or necessary propositions except for banal tautologies. 
I love the way David Papineau highlights this fact in his essay “Th e Poverty of Analysis”:
“First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just 
like scientifi c claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, 
philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers 
depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientifi c theories. And fi nally, the central 
questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed 
at understanding the actual world studied by science, not some further realm of metaphysical 
modality.”17
He concludes: “Philosophy investigates reality in the same way as science. Its methods are 
akin to scientifi c methods, and the knowledge it yields is akin to scientifi c knowledge.”18 Th is 
kind of philosophy does not use conceptual analysis at all. It belongs to the third view on the 
relation between philosophy and science called naturalism.
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. David Pears and Brian McGuinness (London: Routledge, 2001), 
29–30.
15 Gordon P. Baker, Wittgenstein’s Method (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 94.
16 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Th e Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.
17 David Papienau, “Th e Poverty of Analysis,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83, no. 1 (2009): 1.
18 Ibid.
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3
Naturalistic philosophy originates in writings of two great American philosophers – John Dewey 
and W. V. O. Quine. Since “Naturalized Epistemology”, Quine authored a number of defi nitions 
of “naturalism”. I chose the one from the year 1981: “the recognition that it is within science 
itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identifi ed and described”.19 Th is, of 
course, is a direct attack on the Cartesian concept of the fi rst philosophy, prima philosophia or 
scientia universalis. If we depend on synthetic a posteriori beliefs concerning the actual world, 
there is no place for any prior philosophical inquiry. Let us have a look at another defi nition 
of naturalism, this time from Quine’s late paper from 1995: “naturalism holds that there is no 
higher access to truth than empirically testable hypotheses”.20
Th ere are a number of arguments in favor of this methodological naturalism, but I believe 
that there are also good reasons to accept a stronger version of this stance – ontological natural-
ism. Briefl y: methodological naturalists think that the best way of studying natural phenomena 
is scientifi c method; perhaps there are more suitable ways of knowing for some unnatural phe-
nomena. Ontological naturalists are more dyed-in-the-wool and claim that everything there 
belongs to the natural world and therefore can be studied by means of natural science. I think 
this assumption is quite trivial and that we have long had an overlooked argument dating back to 
the 17th century to prove it. I will call it “the Elisabethan Argument for Ontological Naturalism”.
When I say “Elisabeth”, I mean Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, the eldest daughter of Fred-
erick V and Elizabeth Stuart, who is most well-known for her extended correspondence with 
René Descartes. As we all know, Cartesian Dualism postulated the existence of two opposite 
substances: res extensa or corporeal substance and res cogitans or mental substance. When Prin-
cess Elisabeth fi nished reading Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, she wrote him a series 
of letters. In the fi rst one dated 6 May 1643 she asked the most important question: how can an 
interaction between two completely separated substances be possible? For example, how can 
an immaterial soul causally aff ect a material body; or, how can a material sense organ transmit 
information to an immaterial mind? Verbatim she wrote: “I ask you please to tell me how the 
soul of a human being (it being only a thinking substance) can determine the bodily spirits, in 
order to bring about voluntary actions.”21 Descartes could not solve the riddle until his death in 
1650 and even later no one could. Th is meant a complete failure for Cartesian Dualism and its 
early demise in academic philosophy. Th e lesson taught here is this: the alleged immaterial or 
transcendent entities are either causally impotent and therefore – in compliance with Occam’s 
razor – non-existent, or they are in fact material and subject to standard scientifi c investigation. 
I concur completely with Alex Rosenberg’s opinion on the matter, which is simple yet elegant: 
“Th e basic things everything is made up of are fermions and bosons. Th at’s it.”22
If we embrace this strong version of ontological naturalism, then everything there has a physi-
cal base and can be studied by science. We should not be concerned about the hegemony of 
science, because it is just a set of practices that are widespread among all rational beings. Science 
is based on common sense, even though its everyday activities are controlled meticulously by 
experimental and quantitative methods. Th e most popular procedures for controlling a scientifi c 
enterprise is double-blind testing and peer review; they are fallible, of course, but this is the case 
19 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Th ings and Th eir Place in Th eories,” in Th eories and Th ings (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), 21.
20 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means,” Dialectica 49, no. 2–4 (1995): 251.
21 Lisa Shapiro, ed., Th e Correspondence Between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 61–62.
22 Alex Rosenberg, Th e Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 21.
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of all kinds of human knowledge. Th e best formulation of this principle I have found is again in 
Alex Rosenberg’s book Th e Atheist’s Guide to Reality, where he writes:
“Science is just common sense continually improving itself, rebuilding itself, correcting itself, 
until it is no longer recognizable as common sense… Science begins as common sense. Each 
step in the development of science is taken by common sense. Th e accumulation of those com-
monsense steps, each of them small, from a commonsense starting place over a 400-year period 
since Galileo, has produced a body of science that no one any longer recognizes as common 
sense. But that’s what it is. Th e real common sense is relativity and quantum mechanics, atomic 
chemistry and natural selection. Th at’s why we should believe it in preference to what ordinary 
experience suggests.”23
It seems to me that the only way of acquiring knowledge about the world we live in is the 
hypothetico-deductive method described by Karl Popper and Quine. If we apply this method to 
philosophical problems, we might fi nally fi nd some answers to our most prominent questions. 
Traditional branches of philosophy could be transformed into well-established special sciences: 
ontology is just physics, epistemology is part of cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind can 
be understood as a blend of neurology and computer science, philosophy of language has al-
ready dissolved in linguistics and the progress of ethical inquiry can be pushed forward using 
evolutionary biology and game theory.
Are there any real problems for philosophy construed in such a naturalistic or scientifi c way? 
Some are afraid so, for example, Tim Lewens, a philosopher of science at Cambridge University. 
Lewens published an essay entitled “A Surfeit of Naturalism” in 2012 in which he warned against 
“high end science journalism, where one simply reports the fi ndings of scientists in a form that 
philosophers fi nd digestible”.24 I can honestly not see any problem in this account of philosophy. 
Th e questions of philosophy are probably the most interesting and important that humankind has 
ever come up with. Unfortunately, traditional philosophy does not have any tools for answering 
them – the answers must be extracted from science. Fortunately for us philosophers, however, 
scientists themselves are involved in carrying out daily scientifi c practice and they do not have 
enough time to think through the philosophical consequences of their fi ndings. I very much 
sympathize with Hilary Kornblith, who in the recent interview for 3:AM Magazine argues:
“Th ere is a worry that many have expressed that, on the naturalistic way of approaching philo-
sophical questions, philosophy will somehow be co-opted by science. I’m not much worried about 
this. For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although 
science bears on them, are not typically the central focus of those who work in the sciences.”25
I presume that the best demonstration of science solving traditional philosophical problems 
is Alex Rosenberg’s Guide. Th e text is written “in the same empirical spirit that animates natu-
ral science”26 and commits strongly to scientism, which is apparent from the following quotes: 
“Science provides all the signifi cant truths about reality, and knowing such truths is what real 
understanding is all about.”27 Or: “We trust science as the only way to acquire knowledge.”28 
Rosenberg is in all probability the most vociferous proponent of the naturalized worldview that 
I myself fi nd utmost fruitful. Th is is the worldview in which science can answer any question that 
23 Ibid., 167–169.
24 Tim Lewens, “A Surfeit of Naturalism,” Metaphilosophy 43, no. 1–2 (2012): 52.
25 Hilary Kornblith, interview by Richard Marshall, On Refl ection, 3:AM Magazine, January 29, 2013, http://www.3ammagazine.
com/3am/on-refl ection/.
26 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” Th e Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 7 (April 4, 1968): 185.
27 Rosenberg, Th e Atheist’s Guide to Reality, 7.
28 Ibid., 20.
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can be answered and in which the main goal of philosophy is to clean up the mess philosophers 
have made over the last two and a half thousand years.
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